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CHAPTER ELEVEN
SCHOLASTIC POLITICS
America was settled long after the church had ceased to be a
primary factor in the emerging power politics of the modern era.
Mortmain and the dissolution of the monasteries in England broke its
independent economic base.

The national church establishment replaced

the vision of Christendom.

Many functions of the church were absorbed

by the state.

Poor relief was one of these and the Elizabethan poor law

was meant to fill a recent void.
taken up by the state.

In due course, education was similarly

Luther's Germany and Calvin's Geneva initiated

systems of universal public education.

They served the double purpose

of creating an educated citizenry and reproducing the Protestant
character of the Reformation.

A century later, the Puritans of

Massachusetts followed suit.
The jurisdictional rivalry between church, state, and family is
today nowhere more evident than in education.

Each claims a distinct

purpose and interest in the instruction of its members, citizens, and
heirs.

At times, each has been loath to recognize a higher interest or

authority than its own.

Yet nowhere is there a greater community of

interest than in education.

It originated amidst the early cooperation

between church and state. Its purposes were equally republican and
Christian.

The dissension that accompanied the transition from

common schools to a system of public schools exemplifies the growing
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religious and political strains that preceded the Civil War and
continued for some time afterward.

By its nature, education is a

constitutional issue of the first magnitude.
The Public Education Movement
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which anticipated the Constitution
in many details, paid special attention to religious liberty and the
encouragement of education in the opening words of its third article:
"Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged."

1

But there was nothing new about this official

interest in public education.

The Pilgrims and Puritans of colonial New

England also held education in very high regard.

In the estimation of

Moses Coit Tyler:
The proportion of learned men among them in those early days was
extraordinary. It is probable that between the years 1630 and 1690
there were in New England as many graduates of Cambridge and Oxford
as could be found in any population of similar size in the
mother-country . . . . Only six years after John Winthrop's arrival
in Salem harbor the people of Massachusetts took from their own
treasury the funds with which to found a university; so that while
the tree-stumps were as yet scarcely weather-browned in their
earliest harvest-fields, and before the night howl of the wolf had
ceased from the outskirts of their villages, they had made
arrangements by which even in that wilderness their young men could
at once enter upon the study of Ar~stotle and Thucydides, of Horace
and Tacitus, and the Hebrew Bible.
By 1649, public instruction had been made compulsory throughout New
England except in Rhode Island.

In fact, the modern ideal of an

educated citizenry had emerged only a century earlier under similar
circumstances in western Europe.

Ellwood Cubberley attributed its

original impetus to the Reformation:
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Under the new theory of individual responsibility promulgated by
the Protestants the education of all became a vital
necessity . . . . The modern elementary vernacular school . . . may
be said to be essentially a product of the Protestant Reformation.
This is true in a special sense among those peop1es which embraced
some form of the Lutheran or Calvinistic faiths.
Just as the English chancellor--a clergyman--had formerly been keeper of
the king's conscience, the university served this function in Lutheran
Germany, which indicated the high level of public respect for its

. . t ry. 4
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But state control of the new primary school was rejected at

first, even though the reformers were dependent on state or municipal
authorities to compel school attendance. 5

Only much later did state

school systems develop, first in Prussia and then in France, during the
Enlightenment and following the French Revolution.

Voluntary,

church-supported school systems prevailed until 1870 in England, where
separate Anglican and Nonconformist schools operated freely.

6

The tradition of limited government in America may help account for
the public ambivalence toward public schools throughout the nineteenth
and into the twentieth century.

Many supporters of tax-supported public

education enlisted the same arguments that long had been used to justify
tax support for the "public Protestant teacher of piety, religion, and
morality" and compulsory attendance upon his instruction.

They

recognized in the new state systems of public education a ready
instrument for encouraging religion and morality as well as knowledge
among those who lived outside the direct influence of the churches. 7
Stephen Colwell counseled the Protestant churches of his day to set
aside their sectarian rivalries:
No denominational jealousy is exhibited among Protestants when men
read the Bible without a clerical expositor at their side; neither
can they feel any when it is read to, or by the children, in the
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public school; nor when its contents are explained without any view
to those special theologica~ distinctions which mark the lines of
separation betwen Churches.
Opponents, on the other hand, emphasized the dangers of political
and religious tyranny.

The Presbyterian theologian, Archibald Alexander

Hodge, warned of its secularizing effects:
It is capable of exact demonstration that if every party in the
State has the right of excluding from the public schools whatever
he does not believe to be true, then he who believes most must give
way to him that believes absolutely nothing, no matter how small a
minority the atheists or agnostics may be. It is self-evident that
on this scheme, if it is consistently and persistently carried out
in all parts of the country, _the United States system of national
popular education will be the most efficient and wide instrum9nt
for the propagation of Atheism which the world has ever seen.
In England, John Stuart Mill expressed a comparable concern:
The objections which are urged with reason against State education,
do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to
the State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a
totally different thing. . . . A general State education is a mere
contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and
as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the
predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a
priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing
generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it
establishes a despotire over the mind, leading by natural tendency
to one over the body.
But the motives that guided both sides in the controversy were many
and varied.

In the frontier settlements, the chief supporters and

leaders of public education were often ministers.

As David Tyack has

suggested: "There the issue of church and state may more profitably be
examined in terms of clerical influence rather than sectarian
control."

11

The prevailing view of the struggle over public schools is still
largely the one provided by Horace Mann and virtually graven into stone
by Ellwood Cubberley.

David Tyack noted in 1966 that most textbooks in
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American educational history followed the latter's "use of Massachusetts
and New York as paradigm cases of church-state relations in the
nineteenth century" and observed:
The role of ministers in the common school awakening is far less
clear and familiar than their work in founding colleges. Indeed,
through many accounts of the public school movement in
mid-nineteenth-century America runs a strain of anti-clericalism,
as if Horace Mann, fresh from his squabbles with the orthodox
clergy in Massachusetts, were dictating the text. As a result,
ministers have not won recognition for their contribution to public
education, nor has the Protestant coloration of the common school
been examined sufficiently. One reason for this neglect is that
most of the early studies were "house histories," stories written
by school administrators or by education profesors who chose to
disregard ministers because they were outside the profession of
teaching, strangers at best and mischievous meddlers at worst. An
essential part of the creed of these early educational historians
was that schooling should be secular, public in support and
control, and managed by professionals. It was axiomatic to them
that secularization meant progress, Samuel Eliot Morison has
written, and that "schools inspired by the r~irit of religion, or
conducted by ecclesiastics, are worthless."
But current educational history is no longer so closely wedded to the
orthodoxy of an earlier generation of educators.
Some public education advocates regarded compulsory school
attendance as the linchpin in their efforts to assert professional
control over the tax-supported schools.

Massachusetts led the way with

the first compulsory school attendance law in 1852.

13

Cubberley himself

noted the dual purpose:
Everywhere the right of the State to compel communities to maintain
not only the old common school, but special types of schools and
advanced training, has been asserted and sustained by the courts.
Conversely, the corollary to this assertion of authority, the right
of the State to compel children to partake of the educational
advanta~4s provided, has also been asserted and sustained by the
courts.
When taken individually, tax support of schools and compulsory
school attendance laws do not necessarily create the conditions or the
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attitudes that tend to be associated with monopolies.

But taken

together, they do little to discourage the natural tendency by the state
to favor public schools, sometimes to the point of impeding the
operation of private schools.

The financial impediments acknowledged by

Justices Jackson and Rutledge are only part of the story.

Although

early attempts to shut down private and parochial schools were thwarted
by the courts or failed in the legislatures, some states today have
lately sought to enforce detailed regulations that tend to dilute the
differences between public and private schools.

Recent and continuing

efforts by several states to close unaccredited church schools and home
schools are perhaps best understood in light of an educational
monopoly.
This monopoly issue is one of fundamental constitutional
significance.

Through the cooperation of all levels of government, the

civil state has become ultimately responsible for financing public
schools, regulating them through grants-in-aid programs, setting
curriculum standards, compelling attendance, licensing or otherwise
regulating nonpublic schools, accrediting teachers, and establishing
teachers colleges.

In addition, the historical record lends ample

support to the suspicion that many of those who initially lobbied for
public schools and universities sought to promote or reinforce rising or
reigning orthodoxies.

Like so many public education advocates, Thomas

Jefferson drew on the language of religion when describing his vision of
the future for which such--in this case, the University of
Virginia--were to serve as midwives:
It is in our seminary that the vestal flame is to be kept alive;
from thence it is to spread anew over our own and the sister
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States. If we are true and vigilant in our trust, within a dozen
or twenty years a majority of our town legislature will be from one
school, and many disciples will have carried its doctrine home with
them
their several states, and will have leavened the whole
mass.

tg

What these words suggest is the very sort of molding of opinion
that John Stuart Mill found so disturbing a power to vest in the state.
The imposition or maintenance of an ideological orthodoxy is rarely
avowed as a goal by public education advocates, yet it has been
indirectly suggested in a variety of ways.

Horace Mann, for example,

regarded public education as a means of shaping character and reforming
behavior: "Let the Common School be expanded to its capabilities, let it
be worked with the efficiency of which it is susceptible, and
nine-tenths of the crimes in the penal code would become
obsolete . .

"16

Mann was criticized by the Association of Boston

Masters for promoting radical ideas, like the infant school system,
phrenology, and an equal ratio of teachers to students.

17

In very similar terms, James G. Carter commended the establishment
of institutions for the education of teachers: "An institution for this
purpose would become by its influence on society, and particularly on
the young, an engine to sway the public sentiment, the public morals,
and the public religion, more powerful than any other in the possession
of government."

18

Carter equated the state--as sovereign--and the

government when he wrote that the teachers' college "should be
emphatically the State's institution . . . . If it be not undertaken by
the public and for public purposes, it will be undertaken by individuals
for private purposes. 111 9
It is perhaps this potential for imposing an ideological orthodoxy
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that aroused the strongest opposition and posed the greatest danger to
constitutional limitations.

The founders were guided by a belief that

governmental power must be restrained because it tends naturally toward
tyranny.

Later, in remarks that dealt specifically with the Sixteenth

Amendment, John W. Burgess formulated a test for the constitutionality
of governmental powers based on this philosophy of limited government:
What is genuine constitutional Government? It is not simply a
Government based on a written document, without regard to whence
that document came and what it provides. Genuine constitutional
Government rests upon two fundamental principles, principles
without which, whatever else it may be, it is not genuine
constitutional Government. These two principles are, first, that
it must be representative Government and, second, that it must be
limited Government. That is, first, there must be back of
government a more ultimate authority, which decrees the
organization of the Government, vests it with powers, and imposes
upon it limitations. This body or organization we denominate in
political science the sovereign. Now, in genuine constitutional
Government this body must not govern. If this body should govern,
such Government would necessarily be absolute and unlimited, since,
as the original and most ultimate authority in the order of
authorities, there would be nothing back of it which could control
or restrain it.
But this is not yet enough for the establishment of genuine
constitutional Government must be representative Government, but
representative Government can exist without being genuine
constitutional Government. Let us suppose, for example, that there
exists in a given political system a sovereign power organized back
of, separate from, and supreme over the Government, but that it
should vest all of its own power without exception or limitation in
the Government, or all of its power in regard to certain most
important subjects in the Government, such a Government would be
representative, but it would not be constitutional in any true and
genuine sense of the word. It would be an absolute Government, in
whole or part, no matter how benevolently disposed. In order to be
constitutional it must be subject to limitations imposed upon it by
the sovereign in behalf of the Rights and Immunities of the
individual. Constitutional law is a body of limitations on
governmental power and you dare not call any document a
Constitution, no matter from what source it may come, which is not
such. It would not solve, in the slightest degree, the great
problem of political history and political science, the
reconciliation of Government wit2 Liberty. It would simply
0
sacrifice Liberty to Government.
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Religion and Education
The thesis that public education is an establishment of religion or
an attempt to create a new consensus is not a new idea by any means.
Supporters and opponents were equally impressed with the religious and
moral influence of public schools.

Horace Mann often extolled the

virtues of teaching the Bible as a means of inculcating Christian
morals.

21

His conservative critics did not object to instruction in the

Bible so much as derogate the kind of "non-sectarianism" that was
taught.

As David Tyack pointed out, they "feared that he was smuggling

Unitarianism into the curriculum."

22

A major factor in the original success of the public education
movement was the perceived need to channel the waves of new immigrants
into the mainstream of American life.

An overriding purpose of public

education, then, was assimilation into a particular cultural value
system.

23

This still appears to be the guiding purpose with respect to

unassimilated ethnic groups.

But assimilation must be directed by means

of a set of commonly accepted norms.

These norms, in turn, derive from

religious sources, however much educators may attempt to detach them
from their dogmatic roots.

Religious diversity has made it impolitic

for public schools to favor explicitly denominational standards.

But

critics from a variety of religious viewpoints often have little
difficulty in recognizing the religious presuppositions--particularly
those they find objectionable--that infuse everything from curriculum
24
.
t s t o t eac h.lng t ec h nlques.
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Nineteenth-century Catholics criticized the public school system
for attempting to detach their children from the Catholic faith.
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Immigrant groups in general and Catholics in particular were suspected
of cherishing alegiances to foreign sovereigns.

Indeed, Catholic

schools were typically held in official disregard.

One leading citizen

of Boston was quoted as saying that "the only way to elevate the foreign
population was to make Protestants of their children."

25

Michael Katz's

comments on the attitudes of public school officials make the
controversy sound as contemporary as the furor over fundamentalist
Christian schools and home school programs.
In their report for 1854 the school committee complained that the
parochial schools (they termed them "Romanist") had undermined
educational planning. Catholic children were leaving and
re-entering school at such an erratic pace that no enrollment
predictions could be made. Even more serious, the very children
"emanating from a class of our population so destitute of domestic
advantages, as to make them special candidates for all the benefits
of our school system" had been removed from the influence of
excellent tea2gers and facilities and placed in decidedly inferior
institutions.
But in the eyes of many Catholic families the religious bias of
public education was everywhere to be seen.

That same year, the Supreme

Court of Maine upheld in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854), the
expulsion of Bridget Donahoe from a public school in Ellsworth for
refusing to join in reading the King James version of the Bible.

27

State courts normally upheld mandatory Bible reading--whether in the
King James or the Douay version or both--on the grounds that "the Bible
is not a sectarian book."

28

I t is thus evident that whether or not

public schools ever represented an establishment of religion in the
constitutional sense, they played a very similar role at one time and,
like Sunday closing laws, may even yet be structured according to the
assumptions of the establishment tradition even though they are
outwardly secular.
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Secularization was originally offered as the solution to
sectarianism in the classroom.

Its application to public education

significantly anticipated the desegregation policies of more recent
times.

Alexander Bickel recognized a continuity of purpose between

Americanization and later desegregation programs: "Performance of the
assimilationist function required government-owned and
government-managed schools, the presence in the classroom of children of
all nationalities, religions, and classes, and the de-emphasis of
factors like religion, which divided rather than united the children." 29
The pattern or policy of pluralism in public education makes particular
sense if seen in comparison with the ancient Roman strategy of breaking
down parochial exclusivism and forging a new standard for unity by
appearing to embrace all competing loyalties.

30

Although the ideal of

universal religions may be well described by the motto e pluribus unum,
the biblical religions honor doctrinal truth over ecumenical unity.
Instead of agreeing that "all roads lead to Rome," a Christian school is
apt to reply that "strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which
leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it" (Matt. 7:14).
differences of attitude are profound.

The

Each view is exclusive in its own

way and certainly exclusive of the other.

Alexander Bickel quoted

Justice William Brennan's opinion in the Schempp case as an illustration
of the secularist rationale:
"· . . the American experiment in free public education" has
evolved to the point where the schools now "serve a uniquely public
function: the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free
of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort--an
atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to
all American groups and religions."
The mission of the public school so conceived would have required
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not only compulso31 free public education, but exclusive free
public education.
Such exclusivism was clearly the object sought by Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Iowa, and Oregon when they attempted to restrict private
education or, in the case of Oregon, abolish it altogether.

32

But the

Court's Pierce decision of 1925 did not end such political interference
with private education.

Regulation--or subsidization--is a far more

effective mechanism for control than prohibition.

While the Court ruled

out the destruction of private education as a legitimate means of
ensuring educational conformity, it did not refute the logic of the
position these states took.

Felix Frankfurter, who welcomed the Court's

rulings in the Meyer, Pierce, and Bartels cases, later wrote the
majority opinion in the Gobitis case and dissented when this compulsory
flag salute ruling was reversed three years later.

33

It is only to be

expected that public and private schools will operate somewhat at
cross-purposes if there are meaningful differences between them.

The

secular purpose of public education is assimilation to a common
pluralism.

Its primary effect is to avoid and even downgrade what is

considered parochial, divisive, or separatist, as Justice Brennan's
. h"lS
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Short of an

exclusive and universal free public education, the next best means at
the state's disposal is to set detailed curriculum, accreditation, and
testing standards.
Regarded in this light, the Supreme Court's series of decisions
concerning aid to church-affiliated schools assumes a different
character.

Even its accommodationist rulings make eminent sense in view

of this secular purpose of consensus-building.

In the Everson case, the
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Court upheld aid to the parents of school children in the form of
reimbursement for public transportation costs.

In the Wolman case, it

approved the loan of textbooks to individual students, the supplying of
state-mandated standardized tests and scoring services, the provision of
speech and hearing diagnostic services as well as specialized remedial,
therapetic, and guidance services by school board employees.

More

recently, the Court upheld a Minnesota law granting state income tax
deductions for private school tuition in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct.
3062 (1983), a matter that promises further litigation in the future.
Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for the majority in this five to four
decision, maintained that the only source of entanglement was the
requirement that officials determine whether particular textbooks
qualify for the deduction.

Justice Marshall, who wrote for the

dissenters, agreed that the deduction did not completely subsidize the
religious schools.

But he noted that under the Nyquist rule no

subsidization is permissible unless it is restricted to the purely
secular functions of a school.
These decisions were not outwardly designed to advance the cause of
religious free exercise and the Court treated the religious issue as a
minor consideration in the framework of a legitimate secular purpose.
As Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in the Wolman case: "Providing
diagnostic services on the nonpublic school premises will not create an
impermissible risk of fostering ideological views; hence there is no
need for excessive surveillance and there will not be impermissible
church-state entanglement'' (433 U.S. 229, 230).
the balances and found wanting.

Religion was weighed in
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But some critics contend that a strictly secular purpose is no more
neutral with respect to religion than a clearly religious or
antireligious bias.

Whatever else may be said about it, David Martin,

James Hitchcock, Harvey Cox, and other students of the subject have
shown that secularization--and even secularism as a philosophy of
life--is an outgrowth, a reflection, and in part a rejection of biblical
religion. 35
Two issues that have frequently been raised are, first, whether
state-mandated curriculum standards and teacher certification
requirements inhibit the free exercise of religion and, second, whether
such regulations serve as vehicles for an establishment of religion.
John Whitehead and John Conlan, for example, have insisted that changes
in judicial doctrine are in effect establishing a religion of secular
humanism:
Judicial relativism deposits "raw power" in the hands of State
institutions and, in particular, the courts. "In these
circumstances the order of society and the established human rights
are in no way protected against arbitrary power, and there is no
reason why the discernment of right and wrong should not be given
over to an all-powerful State charged with making its own
criteria." The chance of an imposed order becoming a reality in
the modern technological State is imminent. The tide of
totalitarianism can be stemmed by recovering the dignity of Man
based in the creature-Creator relationship. Moreover, to prevent
an imposed State order, Secular Humanism must be finally recognized
as a religious ideology and its unconstitutional e~~ablishment
within our governmental organs must be prohibited.
Paul Toscano echoes these complaints from a different religious
perspective:
. . . the Court not only forbids government from aiding theism, but
it also implies, in the name of religious neutrality, that
traditional, theistic religion should not exert any influence on
government or on government institutions (including public
schools), thus relegating traditional religious beliefs and
convictions to an inferior status in the political arena. By so
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doing, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a trend toward the
establishment of national secularism, a trend that raises many
troublesome questions. Should strongly held beliefs, especially
with regard to education and curriculum, be restrained simply
because the majority feels such beliefs are religious? 7f so, how
3
can religious beliefs be avoided in American education?
John Remington Graham, on the other hand, believes that critics who
single out this epicurean tradition for attack miss the point.

He has

emphasizes that educators should not be "condemned for attempting to
teach children how to think in moral terms.

No education would be

sufficient, or even possible, without instruction concerning what ought
to be, as well as what is."

Graham suggests that, given the broad

definition of religion, the religious nature of education be
acknowledged and that government support of education be maintained "so
long as religious neutrality is observed."

38

This brings the controversy back full circle and raises the
question whether there exist any religiously neutral values or norms by
which schoolchildren may--and should--be socialized and educated.

This

question may be posed even more directly in terms of the the three
criteria of the Supreme Court's establishment clause test: a secular
purpose, a neutral primary effect, and the absence of an excessive
entanglement with religion.

Can state regulation of expressly religious

schools--through licensure, accreditation, or teacher
certification--pass muster under this three-pronged test and, if so, to
what extent?

The same question may be asked about state financing of

expressly non-religious schools in which free religious expression is
unwelcome or views are taught that contradict religious doctrines.

39

Finally, does the Supreme Court's own establishment clause test even
pass its own test of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion?

If the
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problem is primarily one of definition, then it might be further asked
whether there is a single definition of religion that will allow all of
these questions to be answered in the affirmative.
Writing shortly after the Seeger decision of 1965, Marc Galanter
described what he called the "new latitudinarianism:"
In the process of avoiding the constitutional question, the Court
has broadened its notion of religion to include all beliefs which
are sincere, meaningful, and paramount in the lives of their
holders. Thus the theistic element of the earlier view of religion
is supplanted, and with it the application of any "objective"
criterion of the boundaries of religion is rendered extremely
difficult. There now remains no valid test of the content of a
claimed religious belief--neither its truth, good sense,
comprehensibility, theism, or its acceptance by an organized group.
Courts may, at the most, apply general tests of psychic
function--or, ween dealing with institutions, of institutional form
and functions.
This confounding of the boundaries between sacred and profane things
further suggests that the institutional forms and functions of the
modern state, which are derived from a tradition of hierarchical
religion, incorporate one realm as much as the other.
Conduits of Regulation
The public education movement was a natural response to a genuine
need created by the industrial revolution and it still bears the imprint
of its origins.

But the electronics revolution of recent years promises

to gradually undercut the centralizing tendencies that resulted in the
great "paleotechnic" institutions, as Lewis Mumford has called them,
including factories, great bureaucracies, penitentiaries, standing
armies, and centralized educational systems.

41

The growing interest in

home education, for instance, is well-supported by the new
communications technology at a time when the possibilities for

499
sophisticated educational experimentation as well as parental
dissatisfaction and taxpayer resentment over current policies have
perhaps never been greater.

New options are coming within financial

reach for less affluent families.

Current school financing practices

are likely to eventually give way to alternative methods that reflect
the growing decentralization of education and correspond with the
decentralization of work.
Given the pressing financial, educational, and discipline problems
of schools in general, however, there is likely to be much resistance to
alternative systems that may further tax the capacities of established
public school systems.

The present system of school financing contains

built-in incentives to reduce competition and limits programs to a
fairly narrow range of selection.

Enriched programs are often

criticized for elitism and for that reason are particularly vulnerable
to budget cuts.

But an educational system that seeks primarily to

reflect its community and reproduce a harmonious statistical bell is
unlikely to appeal to families with different aspirations, who would
likely turn elsewhere given the opportunity.
Many families with children in private religious schools are
dependent on the availability of aid.

But whether for grade school or

college, the government has become the major supplier or guarantor of
school aid.

Such assistance, however, carries the hazard of entangling

recipient schools in the strings that are normally attached to
government grants.

Several private colleges began discovering a few

years ago that tuition aid to students, for example, was being used as a
means of compelling them to comply with a variety of regulations that
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would otherwise not apply.

42

In a case involving Basic Educational

Opportunity Grants (BEOGs), which are conditioned on a school's
compliance with the sex discrimination guidelines of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, the Court has recently seen fit to limit
the impact of this stipulation to the specific program receiving the
funds.

As Justice White wrote in in Grove City College v. Bell, 104

S.Ct. 1211 (1984):
In defending its refusal to execute the Assurance of Compliance
required by the Department's regulations, Grove City first contends
that neither it nor any 'education program or activity' of the
College receives any federal financial assistance within the
meaning of Title IX by virtue of the fact that some of its students
receive BEOGs and use them to pay for their education. We disagree
(104 S.Ct. 1211, 1216).
In a footnote, Justice White drew an analogy between what the college
termed "indirect aid" and the coverage of local school districts that
receive federal funds through state educational agencies.

As a result

of the decision, this Presbyterian college, which wants "to truly remain
independent of government intervention," has decided to seek other means
of funding student aid.

43

Although this ruling probably falls more into the accommodationist
than the separationist category, accommodation in this case means that
aid is available to those schools that will comply with or accommodate
themselves to the policy agenda of the state.

In recent years, the

state has become a major supplier or guarantor of loans and other aid.
This gives it a commanding position in the market and an ability to
regulate the supply as well to control access.
But the conduits of regulation are many and varied.

If there are

any effective limits at all, they may be political rather than
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constitutional in nature.

According to Stephen Pepper, only twice in

its history--the Sherbert and Yoder cases--has the Court extended
First Amendment coverage on the sole basis of the free exercise clause
by restricting a law considered religiously neutral on its face and in
its intent.

After the Court's ruling in the Lee case, in which an Amish

employer who was himself exempt was required to pay social security
taxes for his employees, Pepper concluded that the "first amendment
doctrine protecting freedom of religious conduct is in significant
disarray.n

44

Now that tax exemptions are effectively being treated as subsidies
rather than immunities, as may be concluded from the decision in Bob
Jones University v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983), it is unclear
whether independence of government intervention exists in more than a
figurative sense.

For example, the tax subsidy and charitable public

trust concepts provided California with a rationale for requiring
churches to forsake political activity.

The fact that a church or a

school has incorporated in order to limit their liability, hold property
in perpetuity, and enjoy a tax-exempt status subjects it to corporate
regulations that are entangling by their very nature.

In the eyes of

the law, only its legal alter ego--the religious corporation--exists.
The communion of the saints has no standing before the bar.
In addition to such voluntary entanglements, there are others that
may be unavoidable.

A sweeping view of the commerce clause, for

example, opens up other regulatory possibilities that are arguably
limited only by political realities or by the First Amendment in
general.

45
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R. Scott Tewes, who finds it difficult to justify revoking the tax
exemptions of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian Schools
under existing free exercise doctrines, has suggested two courses by
which the neutrality principle may be upheld:
Congress could legislate to revoke the tax exemptions along with
those of all other nonprofit organizations. While it would make
the schools subject to taxation, such action would do nothing to
deter the racially based policies of the schools. Alternatively,
under an extremely broad reading of the thirteenth amendment,
Congress could prohibit all private discrimination. By defining
discrimination in this manner, the act could prohibit the schools'
racially based policies. This action, if valid, would stretch the
thirteenth amendment to its limits for the purpose of outlawing the
religiously motivated practice of a few religious groups.
Accommodating the groups seems a small conc~5sion in exchange for
continued religious and individual freedom.
But it is such options as these and similar courses of action that
have created the greatest consternation in the religious community.
This is evident in the support given to the Bob Jones University's
position by various religious organizations.
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Although there is little

general sympathy with racial classifications, churches are not unaware
that even more sensitive categories are now, or in the future may be,
subject to antidiscrimination laws.

Under the regime of a state church,

such direct intervention is to be expected.

But under constitutional

guarantees of religious liberty, the state must observe definite limits
to the pursuit of its social as well as its fiscal and educational
interests.

Even where a compelling state interest is at stake, the

Court has required that the least intrusive means of accomplishing it be
used.

Even so, in the absence of a definition of religious belief and

conduct, such as that set out in the Davis test oath case, the free
exercise guarantees are likely to continue to be subsumed under the
establishment clause or other First Amendment provisions and their
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applications will remain unpredictable.
Cases and Controversies
The crux of the rivalry between church and state--the bottom line
for both of them--is, as always, who will determine the shape of things
to come.

The issue for churches often comes to the flashpoint when they

are forced to defend standards of theological integrity that run
directly counter to prevailing currents of thought in academia, in the
chambers of government, or in the larger community.

The state, on the

other hand has an interest in maintaining public order and may see its
interest to extend to exposing school children to a variety of
experiences and influences that are thought to broaden their minds.
There is much that may be said in favor of both views, but both cannot
equally hope to prevail.
The question of final authority cannot be evaded.

After being

charged with corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates was democratically
tried, condemned, and given hemlock.

Community standards prevailed.

Yet history has been more kind to Socrates than to Athens.
the matter of educational standards today.

Likewise in

For every accusation that

parents and churches are corrupting the minds of young people, or
censoring--even burning--books, there are similar accusations that
schools are turning the hearts of children against their families, or
that religious books are being censored.
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When one person's literature

is another person's religion, the controversy over censorship--to cite
one among many problem areas--eventually deteriorates into a question of
personal predilections, as the Supreme Court bears witness.
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State-mandated curricula and classroom reading selections invariably
founder on the sort of perplexities that inspired Justice Potter
Stewart's remark in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964)
concerning "hard-core pornography" that, although he could not define
it, "I know it when I see it . . .

"

Compulsory school attendance laws and federal aid to education have
naturally bred a series of subsidiary requirements that are supposed to
help determine whether proper educational and social standards are being
met by all schools.

Although some states, like Oregon, do not even

require that private and home schools acknowledge their existence by
registering with education office, the proliferation of grant programs
has created a web of regulation that is increasingly difficult for a
school of any appreciable size to escape.

The possession of state

approval and certified teachers is the secular equivalent of an
imprimatur in the eyes of many of the families for whose patronage a
private school must compete.

In addition, states may offer attractive

incentives--such as grant money, student aid, or special services--to
induce schools to comply with their standards.

For religious schools

that are hard-pressed for money, such offerings may be difficult to
resist and are potentially divisive.

In Roemer v. Board of Public Works

of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976), Justice John Paul Stevens voiced
his concern over the "pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt
religious schools to compromise their religious mission without wholly
abandoning it."

49

It is a remarkable fact that schools begun by

churches for religious purposes so often forsake their affiliation and
become secularized.

While it is not possible to attribute this tendency
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to a single factor, undoubtedly incentives to conform to state
guidelines and the financial realities of keeping a school competitive
with state-subsidized schools have been factors in many cases.
The winnowing process appears to particularly affect older,
well-established institutions, especially those that have grown along
fixed academic and budgetary lines.

But it is with the small, often

resource-poor fundamentalist schools that the greatest conflicts have
been occurring.

Not only are they often the least open to outside

influence, they are also the most resilient in resisting what they
regard as encroachments by the state.
State regulations take a variety of forms.

Accreditation of

schools is one means of assuring that certain minimum standards will be
met.

While accrediting associations are nominally private agencies,

they are usually dominated by tax-supported institutions and exercise
quasi-governmental power.

Oral Roberts University (ORU) pressed a

complaint against the American Bar Association (ABA) after the ABA
denied accreditation to the University's law school on the grounds that
the law school's religion-based admissions and faculty hiring
standards--along with its lack of salary parity with similar schools in
the same geographical area--violated its rules.

ORU objected that the

ABA was using its monopoly power over law school accreditation in
restraint of trade.

The ABA changed the rule in 1981.
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Curriculum standards and teacher certification are other means of
control.

Three cases involving fundamentalist Christian schools were

among the early causes celebres that aroused fundamentalist political
activism.

The first case was State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181
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(1976).

At issue was the applicability of state-mandated curriculum

standards to private religious schools.
issue was the following: "' . .
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Among the requirements at

All activities shall conform to

policies adopted by the board of education.'

(The contention is

advanced by appellants that this standard virtually provides a blank
check to the public authorities to control the entire operation of their
school.)"
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William Ball, who represented Pastor Levi Whisner of

Bradford, Ohio, later reflected on the case: "In the Whisner case,
certain religious institutions, as the price of their existence, were
commanded to comply with provisions contained in a volume bearing the
Aesopian title, 'Minimum Standards.'

The book was 125 pages in length

and contained some 600 'minimum standards.'"
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When questioned during

the trial, witnesses for the State admitted they did not expect full
compliance but could not define what constituted "reasonable
compliance."

The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that these requirements

substantially infringed on the religious liberties of the defendants,
all of whom had been convicted of criminal failure to send their
children to school.
In Kentucky State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980), the
Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the state's claim of authority to
certify teachers in private schools and approve the textbooks.

One of

the expert witnesses for the appellees, Donald Erickson, commented: "The
organizational structure of a school, in its formal and informal
aspects, far from being a mere container into which ideas of many sorts
can be poured, is itself a potent instrument, a 'hidden curriculum,' for
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socializing children to particular lifestyle."
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George Huntston

Williams, a church historian, further stated:
Education is an integral part of the mission of any church for its
own people and for others as well . . . . I do not believe that the
certification which is now mandated by the Legislature is itself
entirely legitimate because these teachers in many cases are
ministers. Surely the State would not have the right to interfere,
to make judgment as to the qualifications of a minister. In fact,
in these religious schools, the clergy are very frequently and
prominently in the position also of teachers. This is the way it
was in antiquity; this is the way it was in the 16th Century; this
is the way it was in the beginning of our own school system in New
England agg elsewhere in this country before we became a
republic.
Rousas John Rushdoony added a theological analysis:
In fundamentalist religious teaching is required a strict adherence
to Scripture. The State, according to Romans 13, is a ministry
under God and a ministry of justice . . . . So that our offices of
state are, to a fundamentalist, religious officers whether gr not
5
they have faith. They are accountable, therefore, to God.
The Court cited the debates over the language of the original compulsory
school attendance law in Kentucky and the Beckner amendment, which
provided "that in the future there shall be no provision made requiring
those who are conscientiously opposed to sending their children to
public schools to do so." 57

Since that decision, the conflict has

shifted to state approval or licensure to the schools themselves.
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The third case was State of North Carolina v. Columbus Christian
Academy, No. 78-0VS-1678 (1979), which was made moot by a new law that
excluded "nonpublic education from all education laws except those
dealing with fire, safety, sanitation, and immunization." 59

The Academy

had "challenged the state regulation of private schools in the areas of
teacher certification, curriculum, length of school day and school year,
health certification, and student inoculation."
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Direct licensure of church-affiliated schools has arisen as an
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issue occasionally.

In New Jersey State Board of Higher Education v.

Board of Directors of Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470 (1982), the New
Jersey Supreme

Co~rt

issued a permanent injunction against the college,

which is operated by Bible Presbyterian Church, restraining it from
awarding credits or degrees without a license from the State Board of
Higher Education.
secondary schools.

But mcst such litigation involves primary and
Some states have held firm in their commitment to

state approval, while others have been moving in the direction of the
Whisner precedent.

Though some states may yet appeal court rulings in

favor of the church and home schools, others have conceded.
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The state that has stirred the most controversy over its school
certification requirement is Nebraska, one of a handful of states that
still apply fairly stringent approval standards for private schools.
Nebraska schools are required by law to register with the state, employ
as regular teachers only certified graduates of approved college
teacher-training programs, observe mandatory curriculum standards,
administer standardized tests, and provide a library containing at least
a specified minimum number of books, no more than which a very small
- .
.
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Some exceptions have been made

and enforcement has been fairly selective in some parts of the state.
But the Amish communities and fundamentalist churches have been the most
visibly affected.

By 1983, some twenty-two churches had joined together

to oppose the law.
The case that has received the most publicity involves Faith
Baptist Church in Louisville.

The pastor of the church, Rev. Everett

Sileven, started a weekday school in the church basement in 1977.
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Litigation began a few months later and culminated in an unfavorable
ruling against the church in Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.
2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 75 (1981 ).
operate.

But the school continued to

Shortly before classes were scheduled to open in the autumn of

1982, the school was ordered closed by the sheriff.

At one point, Rev.

Sileven was arrested in the church sanctuary while meeting with the
students and jailed for contempt of court.
full four-month sentence.

He eventually served out the

When the school continued to meet, the church

doors were padlocked between regular church services and protesting
ministers were bodily removed by sheriff's officers.

Some of the

parents were charged with violating the truancy law.
The case caught the attention of the national news media late in
1983 wben seven fathers of the schoolchildren were jailed shortly before
Thanksgiving and remained in jail for mere than three months.

Their

wives and children meanwhile had taken refuge across the state line.

A

panel was appointed by Governor Robert Kerrey to investigate the
situation.

Late in January the panel declared that the teacher

certification procedures violated the free exercise rights of Christian
schools and recommended that church schools be exempted.

Following

several attempts, legislation to relieve the churches was finally passed
in March.

The new law is scheduled to take effect in July.

But Rev.

Sileven was arrested and jailed again upon returning to the state late
in April of 1984.

.
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reso l u t lon.

As of this writing, the issues still await a full

Similar incidents have taken place in Lincoln, York,

North Platte, and Grand Island, including cumulative fines at one school
and the search and seizure of school files at another.

64
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Federal regulations have also been a source of friction.

On August

21, 1978, IRS announced a "Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private
Tax-Exempt Schools" designed to determine whether private schools have
racially discriminatory policies that disqualified them for tax
exemption.

This aroused considerable opposition from religious groups

throughout the country and IRS received approximately 125,000 letters of
protest.

~!hen

hearings were held late that autumn, state and local

leaders from almost every state testified against the procedure.
120 members of Congress were included in the state delegations.

Nearly
For

several years afterwards, the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments were
attached to appropriations bills to prevent enforcement of the
procedure.
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The proliferation of Christian day schools in recent years, which
James Carper has termed "the first widespread secession from the public
school pattern since the establishment of the Catholic schocls in the
nineteenth century,"
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home school movement.

has also been broadening in scope through the
It may be expected that much of the new legal

ground here will be broken by litigation over home schools in coming
years.

Here the appeal is not to the free exercise rights of

church-related ministries but the rights of parents and families,
whether or not these are understood in terms of religious conviction.
Historically speaking, home education enjoyed priority in the American
colonies and during much of the nineteenth century.

E. Alice Law

Beshoner commented on the nature of the transition to public education:
The state assumed the role of aiding the parents in the task of
preparing their offspring for adulthood by providing
state-supported "free" schools to which the parents could, if they
chose, delegate some portion, or all, of this parental
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responsibility. Thus, the important issue in the first half of the
nineteenth century was not whether the state could compel school
attendance, but wtether or not parents could demand that the state
aid them in their duty at public expense. The issue was resolved
in favor of the parental demand and resulted in the rise of large
tax-supported systems of elementary schools in the North. Although
viewed as an "aid" to the parent, the establishment of public
education in the North, and, after the Civil War, in the South, had
the ultimate effec5 of eroding the common law parental right over a
child's education. 7
As Charles Burgess has noted, the reassertion of the old Roman law
doctrine of parens patriae--which had earlier been used by the state to
take custody of infants whose persons or property had been violated--and
the extension of its concept of infancy well into the teenage years were
contributing to this ersoion of parental rights by the turn of the
century.
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Although it is too early to predict how the courts ,will divide the
issues in the growing controversy over home education, the argument is
being made in some circles that the state lacks a compelling interest in
requiring certification of teachers and equivalency of curriculum if can
not even demonstrate a correlation between compliance with these
standards and the educational achievement of students. 69

At one point,

the compulsory school attendance law of North Carolina, which had been
modified to accommodate the objections of Christian schools, was ruled
unconstitutional by a federal district court because of its lack of
equity as applied to home education: "If the state makes no attempt to
maintain minimal educational standards in nonpublic schools, its
requirement that a school be attended is little more than empty
coercion, particularly when those children are in fact being relatively
1t1ell educated at home." 70

The state's interest in the education of

school age children, including its authority to set minimum standards,

512

has been consistently upheld in the courts, but the ccnstitutional
boundaries of its interest and authority are being tested in great
detail.

Litigation is being used to establish precedents and each side

seeks test cases in which it can work from a position of strength.
as has often been said, "hard cases" establish bad precedents.

But

71

Particular regulations are vulnerable to challenge unless a
compelling state interest can be shown and unless the least restrictive
means of enforcing that interest are used.

A "clear and compelling

proof" standard of evidence, as opposed to a preponderance of the
evidence standard or a balancing test, has been suggested by some
critics as the best way to secure the preferential position of religious
liberty.
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The proliferation of new varieties of nonpublic schools has

resulted in numerous gradations between traditional church schools and
home schools.

Resolution of the competing interests between curriculum

standards, compulsory school attendance requirements, parental choice,
and religious liberty is likely to eventually require policies that
apply to all nonpublic school alternatives equally.

Thus issues of

religious liberty for church schools and parental choice appear to be
inseparably linked in the larger context of civil liberty.
Despite the increasing proportion of litigation involving nonpublic
schools, public education controversies, where the free exercise and
establishment ccncerns wEre first raised, have not disappeared.

Old

battles over school prayer, Bible reading, and released time for
religious classes have been supplemented by others, such as the teaching
of the creation account of origins, the distribution of religious
literature on campus, and the holding of religious meetings by students.

513
Two decades after the Supreme Court's Engel and Schempp rulings
agEinst prayer and Bible reading, faculty members, elected officials,
and school boards continue to ignore or actively resist the letter and
spirit of these rulings.

In Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.

1981 ), affirmed, 455 U.S. 913 (1982), a federal court struck down a
Louisiana policy permitting classroom teachers to ask whether any
interested student would like to offer a prayer at the start of the
school day.

In Collins v. Chandler Unified School District, 644 F.2d

759 (9th Cir. 1981 ), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981 ), another federal
court ruled that permission may not be granted to a student council
re~uest

to choose members of the student body to open each school

assembly with a prayer.
The issues persist not simply out of habit or defiance but very
often because of the strong religious significance attached to public
gatherings.

The word church or congregation originally meant a public

assembly for worship.

Public meetings were traditionally opened with

prayer, a custom which persists--despite its religious origins--in state
legislative assemblies and Congress today.

While the religious content

of particular customs--like civil ceremonies and holidays--may change,
their significance as religious exercises appear to be widely understood
and accepted. 73

Similarly, there is little doubt about the religious

origin and significance of Sunday closing laws despite the Supreme
Court's ruling in the McGowan case that they had evolved into a secular
and religiously neutral designation of a public day of rest.

The

official purpose attributed to sabbath laws is often less significant to
supporters than the fact of their continued observance.
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The issues have raised civil religious otservances occasionally
provoked spirited dissents from the federal bench.

Justice Brennan's

dissent in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983), made clear that he
did not regard historic precedent for the opening of a legislative
session with prayer by a paid chaplain--as a defense against its
unconstitutionality as an establishment of religion.

Justice Douglas

had earlier hinted much the same thing in his Engel concurrence.

The

problem here is the ambiguous meaning of the First Amendment language as
applied by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The wording of the two

clauses--"respecting an establishment" and "prohibiting the free
exercise"--is not directly parallel.

The Supreme Court, however, has

construed them as parallel restraints and has given them equal weight in
application.

This may be a source of the tension or conflict that

allegedly exists

bet~tJeen

the tvm clauses.

respective claims are sometimes balanced.

Consequently, their
But disagreements have

persisted and the high level of litigation is one indication of both the
lack of public consensus and the strength of continuing oppositions to
separate religion from public life.
One example of this lack of public consensus is the school prayer
issue.

Since the Engels and Schempp decisions of two decades ago, bills

have been repeatedly introduced and sometimes debated on the floor of
Congress.

Despite its symbolic importance, it reflects a conscious

association of religion and education in the minds of m&ny people.

For

this reason, it is likely to remain a matter of continuing interest
despite uncertainties about the place of religion, if any, in the public
school classroom.

O~e

Vermont teacher, Peter Huidekoper, believes that
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school prayer or a moment of silence is not the issue:
It is not the moment of silence, then, that concerns us most. It
is a whole school day of silence about God, an attitude that
restricts and endangers truly free inquiry and open discussion
about matters if they happen to take on a religious nature. It is
this silence, this attitude, that concerns us very deeply . . . . We
must return to a teacher's essential task: to stretch the
imagination. And we must remember that we diminish the
intellectual and spiritual growth of our students when we succumb
to the current absurdity that simply to speak of God
religious
values and beliefs is--Lord help us--against the law.

94

A recent opinion by a federal judge in a school prayer case,
Jaffree v. James, 544 F.Supp. 727, 732 (1982), which challenged what he
called "judicial fiat," held:
The case law, in the opinion of the Court, has overlooked the
totality of what is religion in its consideration when deciding
issues under the establishment clause of the Constitution. The
background of this country and its laws is one based upon the
Judea-Christian ethic. It is apparent from a reading of the
decision law that the Courts acknowledge that Christianity is the
religion to be proscribed . . . . The religions of atheism,
materialism, agnosticism, communism and socialism have escaped the
scrutiny of the courts throughout the years, and make no mistake
these are to the believers religions; they are ardently adhered to
and quantitatively advanced in the teachings and literature that is
presented to the fertile minds of the students in the various
school systems. If the courts are to involve themselves in the
proscription of religious activities in the schools, then it
appears to this Court that we are going to have to involve
ourselves in a whole host of areas, such as censorship, that we
have theretofore ignored or overlooked.
In Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 103 S.Ct. 842 (1983),
Justice Powell reinstated an injunction against school prayers in
Alabama and the Supreme Court rejected the school prayer law in Wallace
v~

Jaffree, 104 S.Ct. 1704 (1984).

But Judge W. Brevard Hand's earlier

dismissal of the suit in Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 554
F.Supp. 1104 (1983), evoked memories of an older custom, interposition,
which likewise had religious origins, particularly in the Calvinist view
that lesser magistrates may interpose their authority when a higher
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magistrate errs. 75
In a number of recent controversies, conflicting precedents have
been set by the federal courts, adding further confusion.

For example,

a student-sponsored prayer group in one public school was ruled
unconstitutional in Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent
School District, 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), but a similar prayer
group in another public school was upheld under free speech protections
in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 563 F.Supp. 697 (M.D.Pa.
1983).

One indication of a possible favorable ruling in these cases by

the Supreme Court is that it upheld such meetings on a state university
campus in the Widmar case, ruling that students must be allowed equal
access to public forums for religious functions.

But the Court has

usually shown itself more favorably disposed toward liberal standards at
the college level because of the comparative maturity of the students.
An attempt by Congress to address the issue failed in May of 1984.
Another area of controversy that has received considerable
attention in the press from time to time is the teaching of evolution
or, alternatively, the teaching of creation in public school classrooms.
The Scopes trial of 1925 in Tennessee, which was one of the memorable
events of that period, culminated decades of what Andrew Dickson White
termed "the warfare of science with theology."

But it was not until the

Epperson case in 1968 that the Court struck down a law prohibiting the
teaching of evolution in public schools.

Mississippi was the last state

to repeal a similar law in 1972.
Attention has lately shifted to state laws requiring equal time for
creation or a balanced treatment of evolution and creation as theories
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of origins.

Some states, like Oregon, have taken a permissive position

on the question, allowing local school districts the option of including
or excluding the teaching of creation along with evolution in biology
classes.

But a federal court ruled against an Arkansas statute

requiring balanced treatment in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education,
529 F.Supp. 125 (E.D.Ark. 1982).

More recently, the Louisiana Supreme

Court has upheld a similar law in that state.
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Advocates of

"scientific creationism" contend they are able to avoid overt religious
teaching by confining their endeavors to considering scientific
evidences for creation.

Opponents claim the issue is not a scientific

question at all but strictly a religious one.

Whatever the merits of

the particular arguments for or against the teaching of creation
alongside evolution in public schools, the exclusive teaching of
evolution as a theory of origins clearly raises serious questions about
the possibility of religious neutrality in the classroom where an
established scientific or ideological orthodoxy competes to a greater or
lesser degree with a traditional religious orthodoxy. 77
Families that hold clear convictions concerning textbooks have
typically been responding by withdrawing from the public school system.
Along with the lack of religious teaching, dissatisfaction over the
curriculum and textbooks have been among the many factors which have
strenthened the Christian school movement in recent years.

In this

respect, the current issues and responses are not materially different
from the reaction of Catholic families in the nineteenth century to
what they regarded as the teaching of Protestant values in public
schools.

They may or may not have been mistaken about the purpose of
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the public schools but these families judged them by their fruits.
Conclusions
The innumerable conflicts that have arisen over the setting of the
educational agenda are unlikely to be resolved through legislation or
adjudication by the courts.

The persistence of many issues reflects

real--perhaps growing--divisions over the place of the family, church
and state in community life.

As symptoms of cultural disintegration and

reorientation they might best be regarded as warning signals rather than
political problems that have direct or immediate solutions.

When

confronted by two women who claimed the same infant, King Solomon did
not solve the problem by dividing the child between them.

He wisely

avoided the obvious dilemma by judging their motives and convictions.
The interests of the state in fostering education have been clearly
asserted from the earliest period of American history.

Common schools

were publicly supported in many parts of New England as early as the
1640s.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 set aside public land for the

support of schools in ther federal territories.

Thus public aid for

education has been the earliest expression of the state's interest.
After the late 1830s, the public school movement and, later, compulsory
school attendance laws began to spread across the country.

Parochial

school systems developed in response to the perceived religious bias of
the tax-supported schools.

In more recent years, the Christian school

movement has grown in response to the secularization of public schools.
Considerable controversy is centered on religious activities in public
schools and the availability of public funds for nonpublic schools.

The
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jurisdictional boundaries between family, church, and state are not
clearly drawn in current law, which has had the result of making it
difficult to sort out competing interests and bringing them into
constitutional harmony.

This as increasingly become a matter left to

the arbitration of the courts, perhaps in part by default, at a time of
rapid cultural change.
But the recognition of education as a ministry of the church is
again gaining increasing acceptance in otherwise disparate religious
circles. 78

The extent and limits of the state's interest in regulating

church and home schools have consequently become subjects of political
controversy.

Some churches and families see the issue as unfriendly

political interference, while some public educators regard the issue as
one of preserving school systems as enrollments decline and the portion
of families with children in public schools declines.

Many regulations

are suspected of deliberately making private schools less competitive
with public schools by establishing mandatory standards that tend to
either dilute essential differences in the educational product or raise
the operating costs of the schools.

The burdens, however, tend to be

inhibitory rather than prohibitory.

Few states have adopted regulations

that clearly restrict religious liberty.
Thomas Vitullo-Martin notes that ''the potential for powerful
control of private schools

is not yet developed.

The enforcement

of state regulations on private schools is not highly directive. 1179

But

the lobbying on all sides of various educational issues, like tuition
tax credits and lower school attendance age requirements, has been
intense in recent years.

Tuition tax credits have been described by the
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National Education Association as a vehicle for creating an educational
caste system because of the exclusivity of nonpublic schools.

The

American Civil Liberties Union has similarly complained about credits
because of the lack of regulation of private schools by the state.
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Whether or not tuition tax credits or education vouchers ever generally
prevail, supporters would do well to consider their potential for
entanglements and a resultant demand for greater regulation of private
education.

Wisdom dictates avoiding unnecessary dilemmas.

Seen purely as a problem in political pragmatics, the protection of
religious liberty in private and public education requires that at a
minimum the close tie between tax-support for schools and compulsory
school attendance laws be weakened or severed.

One proposal is to end

the state establishment of schools in favor of competitive private
school systems.

While this is the goal of libertarians like Murray

Rothbard and Joel Spring, it is gaining support from other quarters.
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Another possibility would be to require some level of tuition to be
paid by all families, not just those that reside outside the district.
But neither course is likely anytime soon unless economic conditions or
public attitudes radically change.

Rockne McCarthy, James Skillen, and

William Harper believe that there must be a redefinition of public
responsibility for education along with greater recognition given to
parental responsibility and a redesign of public funding procedures.
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Stephen Arons believes that any solution requires at least the following
elements:
First, a state's school-financing system may not condition the
provision of free education upon the sacrifice of First Amendment
rights. Second, a state may not, consistently with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, permit educational
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choice for affluent parents while inhibiting it for poor parents.
Third, state regulation of private schools may not substantially
affect value inculcation within tg3m unless there is a compelling
state justification for doing so.
In the meantime, religious liberty is being defended in some
quarters as a constitutional right that is second to none.

This carries

a risk that the judicial balance may be tipped toward license on the
part of some avowedly religious organizations, as the Ballard, Saia, and
Terminiello decisions arguably did in the past.

But while deterrence is

a legitimate public expectation when respect for law rules, the
reconstitution of law requires first of all a citizenry willing to take
responsibility for assuring public justice.

It is here that the

interests of religion and politics must converge if free institutions
are to be maintained.
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